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The Interest Condition in Delaying Temporary Laws Actions

*Eid Ahmad Al-Husban**

ABSTRACT

Temporary laws are legal acts that Jordanian cabinets use in the cases of emergency, when the parliament is not sitting or when it is desolated in accordance with article 94 in the Jordanian constitution. After the Law of Supreme Court of Justice 12/1992, it became possible to delay the temporary laws which violate the constitution.

The question which arises here is: whether the legal system of administrative actions is applicable to the delay of temporary laws actions?. For: this purpose this study deems to discuss the interest condition as one of the main conditions to the delay of temporary laws actions

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