

Assessing the Political History of Foreign Powers and Jordan Survival Strategy (1921-2018)

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ABSTRACT

This research attempts to understand and analyze those traditional regional security challenges facing the Kingdom of Jordan and the extent to which such challenges are comparable to the existing security challenges today. It aims to examine also the role of foreign powers in influencing its survival strategy throughout the period 1921-2018. The research tries to tackle questions: to what extent traditional security challenges facing Jordan sovereignty and its existence remain today? And how the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan managed to survive these challenges since its creation in 1921? And what is the role of foreign powers in influencing events in this respect? Several attempts by various regional powers provided that the kingdom was and remains within vicious circle of regional attacks that threaten its existence. Accordingly, the research will demonstrate the kingdom's survival political stability policy in countering various external challenges threatening its endurance to sustain. A historical demonstration has been examined thoroughly to reflect such challenges and survival mechanisms alike. The research concludes that despite the fact that one century has been elapsed since the foundation of the modern state of Jordan, the threats associated with kingdom's survival remains at stake. It is worth noting that such challenges has had taken different forms in various historic junctures. Whereas military threats was seen the main instrument adopted in the past, political threats however, becomes the predominant form adopted by those regional powers with special reference to Israel.

Keywords: Survival, Stability, Financial Assistance, Sovereignty, legitimacy, Foreign Policy.

I. The Creation of the Modern State of Jordan and Its Ruling Regime The Emirate of Transjordan (1921-1946)

In June 1916, Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, Emir of Mecca, launched the Great Arab Revolt - in alliance with Great Britain and France - against Ottoman rule to end four centuries of occupation in the Arab world¹. As the Ottomans sided with central powers during World War One (WWI), both the Emir and his allies had common interests towards eradicating Turkish presence in the Arab region. For his support, Britain promised the Sheriff a full support for a unified kingdom for the Arab lands under his reign. In 1918, the forces of Emir Faisal – third eldest son of Sharif Hussein - succeeded in liberating Damascus and most areas of Bilad Alsham (Greater Syria) and formed an independent government in Damascus (History of Jordan, 2002). He was proclaimed king of Syria in March 1920. Transjordan (later Jordan) was then a part of greater Syria governed by the King (Vatikiotis, 1967: 37).

However, by end of the War, Sharif's dreams were completely blown away by colonial interests in the region. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916² and the Balfour Declaration in 1917³ had dismissed all Emirs' aspirations for Arab unification⁴ and so, King Faisal was overthrown forcibly by French forces in July of 1920.

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¹ These talks are known as Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (July 1915-January 1916). Mc Mahon was then the British higher commissioner in Egypt.

² Which divides the newly liberated Arab areas between colonial powers (Britain and France).

³ The declaration provided a commitment letter by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to a prominent British Jew, Lord Rothschild promising a home for Jews in Palestine.

⁴ History of Jordan during the Ottoman Empire: <http://www.kingabdullah.jo/hashemites/hashemites.html>

In attempt to restore his brother's throne in Syria, and after loosing ambitions of becoming the king of Arabia (King Abdullah, 83)⁵, Emir Abdullah – second eldest son - headed north towards Syria in November 1920 but he had to stop midway (Trans-Jordan) as Syria became under the French mandate. To him, Transjordan then was a transit and no more than a passage to Syria, not a place for settlement (Nevo: 1996, 3). In coordination with the British⁶, he successfully managed to secure the reign of Transjordan⁷ in April, 11, 1921 and soon after established a government covering three main districts each of which was governed by a British adviser: the northern district of Ajloun, the mid district of Balqa, and the southern district of Karak⁸.

Since his arrival to Transjordan and the Amir consistently attempted to maintain strong though balanced ties between the British authorities on the one hand and Arab nationalist representatives on the other. His eager remained high to capitalize on Syrian's nationalist support that was then inevitable asset to help him to restore the Hashemite throne in Damascus. He placed Transjordan as a safe heaven zone for Arab rebellions (mainly Syrians) who escaped from French authorities. In the same vein, he maintained consistent contacts with British authorities – who supported him financially and militarily – realizing that no compromise could be done without their help. In this respect, his meeting with Winston Churchill in Jerusalem in 1920 revolved around his current role in Transjordan and his future chances to rule the greater Syria as well. It also laid the ground for Abdullah to be proclaimed Amir of Transjordan the following year (ibid. 6-7).

In the meantime, the British were embarking on preparing the grounds for establishing then a newly Jewish state in Palestine where the future of Transjordan was not yet clear to them. They demanded Abdullah to clear Transjordan from any nationalist activities - whether against the French or Zionist groups in Palestine. Certainly, this is maybe construed the first foreign bargain incident reflecting the role of financial foreign assistance in influencing Jordan's foreign policy. Most importantly, such mutual interests instance also signified the significance of foreign interventionist policy in preserving political stability status quo and thus forged the very beginning of dividing gap between regime and public opinion.

In parallel, within the early years since his arrival, internal and external virulent threats and attacks began to influence Abdullah's balanced policy in favor of his British allies. The local revolutions of Kora inhabitants followed by the Adwan tribe against Abdullah were serious and alarming challenges to his existence in Transjordan (Ajlani, 1995: 22). On the southern part likewise, he also witnessed continued threats from the Wahhabis forces attacks⁹ (August 1922) of Ibn Saud who eventually succeeded in building strong ties with some of southern Jordanian tribes. He claimed that Transjordan was an extension of his Kingdom (Morris, 1959: 111-113). In 1924, their forces were only nine-miles to the south of Amman to the point where they almost had changed the history of Transjordan (Lias, 1956: 70-73).

In both cases, the British had to use air raids (RAF) and forces to restore situations and maintain Abdullah's 'throne' in Transjordan. This also shows the first time ever that foreign power uses military power to preserve his throne and stability against not only public but also foreign threats. Clearly, without British help, the Emirate could not deter nor to maintain its unity. "More importantly, it [the ultimatum] forcibly reminded Abdullah, in case he had forgotten the lessons of the 'Adwan revolt' and the other massive Wahhabi attack of 15 August 1922 that he could not rule Transjordan without British military support (Wilson, 1987: 84). The Ibn Saud incident marked the first historical temptation by foreign and local forces to threaten the survival of the modern state of Jordan. In the same vein, it marked the first foreign intervention to maintain the stability of the Hashemite regime and the maintenance of its sovereignty. Hence, a common interest began to evolve between Abdullah and the British. They both needed each other. Abdullah wants to maintain power and achieve his wilder goals whilst British needed the area clean from any religious or nationalist threats. The idea of a buffer zone in Transjordan between three powerful regions - Wahhabis, Syrian, and Iraq - began to formulate the future geopolitical map of Transjordan.

⁵ The battle of Turaba- between Abdullah and Ibn Saud- had marked the end of Hashemite expansionist

⁶ Under the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement, the British recognized the Emir as an official ruler of Transjordan in 1923.

⁷ Though, Britain remained controlling of major sectors and sensitive areas (i.e. foreign affairs and military issues).

⁸ At that time, the British had annexed the southern cities of Hijaz Kingdom, Ma'an and Tabouk, to the Emirate.

⁹ The British were worried of the danger of such Islamic movement to endanger the future of Jewish state in Palestine.

In the meantime, Zionist groups also had long interests in Transjordan on the premises that the Balfour Declaration had included a large portion of the eastern part of Palestine to their national home in Palestine (Gelber, 1997: 7). The leader of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann defended that “we see in Transjordan the eastern part of Eretz Israel. However, we shall not build the bridge across the river of Jordan with soldiers – we shall make our way by Jewish labor, with the plough and not with sword” (ibid. 19). Hence, they had discretely and gradually sought to annex the East Bank (Transjordan) to their national home in Palestine without the use of forces and by nonbelligerent means. Accordingly, the Jewish Agency had embarked on establishing several projects and activities in the eastern part of Palestine where a number of Jewish organizations and associations were involved¹⁰ (Ibid, 19).

Realizing that his ambitions began to fade away of restoring his brother’s throne in Syria, Britain became more interested than ever of recognizing him, Emir of Transjordan. In turn, the latter had to gradually initiate warm diplomatic ties with French authorities in Damascus and in parallel deepening his alliances with Britain. He agreed to unify his forces under Peake’s command (who preceded Globb Pasha) to form a Jordanian army (the Arab Legion). The Jordanian Army continued under the supervision of British high ranked officers until 1956.

The shift of Abdullah’s policy interests had played a significant role in creating his own presence in Transjordan region. From his perspective, his stability was more abide with external powers (mainly Britain) than with the then fluctuated ties with his local inhabitants. To demonstrate so, he for instance provided the British with the Arab Legion to restore Ghazi’s throne in Iraq and accepted the British partition policy of Palestine in 1937 and 1947 (Smith, 1996: 146)¹¹.

Indeed, the defeat for the Arab armies had given Israel the upper hand during negotiation process that followed the War against Arab governments. The two sides had eventually signed an armistice treaty in Rhodes Island in 1950 whereby the eastern part of Palestine (West Bank) was to be attached to the Transjordan (East Bank) under the reign of King Abdullah. The two banks forge what is known today the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan). (Smith, 160). In July 1951, a young Palestinian, Mustafah I’usha, had assassinated King Abdullah on the doors of Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Due to mental illness reasons, Prince Talal, could not maintain the throne for more than two years. His eldest son Hussein had succeeded him and was proclaimed the reign of Jordan on 1953 (History of Jordan, 2002).

King Abdullah I era witnessed different vicious external and some external threats that challenged the survival of his Emirate/Kingdom where the British were a key factor in maintaining his throne and kingdom preserved. In turn, the King helped the British to maintain its dominant influential hegemonic role in the region.

II. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under King Hussein

II.I. King Hussein, Nasser and the end of British supremacy

In the early reign of late king Hussein and just before the demise of British presence in the late 1950s, the latter continued to play a key influential player in preserving political stability of regime by supporting tribal families financially particularly with their integration in the Arab legion . In this respect, Anne Marie Baylouny reveals:

“John Bagot Glubb, the British officer charged with subduing the Bedouin, recruited the desert tribes into the Arab Legion, offering benefits unavailable elsewhere. Famines were created and then alleviated by the ruling British. Tax revolts were forcibly put down by the army, the institution which integrated and employed the local population. Initially somewhat mercenary in origin, with some hailing from outside Jordan, military personnel became regime supporters.”¹²

By mid 1950s, the geopolitical map worldwide began to take new shape. The rise of the two new superpower rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union to supplant the classical European ones between United Kingdom and

¹⁰ The Jewish National Fund (purchasing lands in Transjordan), Jewish labor and commerce (establishing projects in Transjordan), and Transjordanian Frontier Force (where many Jews succeeded in joining this force), are clear examples of Jewish interests penetration to Transjordan (Gelber, 19).

¹¹ See Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab Israeli conflict*, 1996, Martin’s Press NY

¹² Baylouny, Anne. "Military Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy." *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 2 (2008).

France was the major shift in the international relations spectrum. Clearly such changes had had dramatic changes and implications for the other countries, particularly on the developing countries. New movements and parties were evolved in adherence to one of the two competing power's principles where Communism versus Capitalism race embroiled both domestic and foreign policy of every single nation worldwide.

On the Arabic realm, the rise of Abdul Naser's 'star', the president of Egypt, had no less effect on the Arabic nationalist movements particularly during the 1950s-1960s. His influence had toppled governments and changed foreign policies in most of the Arabic countries. Iraq and Syria were the most affected by Nasirism's excessive waves. It had effectively contributed to the end of the Hashemite reign in Iraq in July 1958, and the formation of the then United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt in Feb 1958. That accordingly had resulted in great deal of implications against Jordan and particularly for King Hussein who strive hardly to maintain his power and distance the kingdom from its regional events.

As for Jordan, the Kingdom was also in the heart of all conflicting different forces regionally and internationally. Adding to this, the increase of Palestinian origin populations - as a result of the events of 1948 war and the unification of the two banks in 1951 - who had genuine attachment and appreciation for the Naser of Egypt. Nationalism began to take a new shape and became more influential and assertive over years. The 1957 parliament elections were considered as one of the most prosperous eras in the history of Jordan's democratic process so far. Again, when democracy tended to threatening or challenging regime's interests particularly in the foreign policy front, the king had occasionally demanded the suspension of the 'democratic process' by dissolving the parliament. King Hussein's strategy was not much indifferent with that of his grandfather. He continued a pro-western policy, with stronger association with the United States in particular. He nevertheless was forced to bridge short 'warm' but cautious ties with Egypt during frenzy days of late 1950s and early 1960s through which Nasir was able to fill the European influence gap - particularly after Suez crises of 1956.

The containment policy was the main policy adopted by the King. His main challenges had emanated from various types of Nationalists movements rather than Islamic ones in that he forged and strengthened his ties with the latter as a step to counter the growing influence of the former. However, it worth noting here, that the distinctiveness between King Hussein and his grandfather Abdullah's epochs reside in the changes of regional balance of power. Whereas domestic politics during King Abdullah's tenure was directly involved with Jordan-Israeli relations, King Hussein's era however, was more involved with a broader Arab-Israeli conflict. With the rising of American hegemony in the region after the Suez crises, the King began gradually but vigilantly moving towards Washington camp. Generally speaking, unlike his fluctuated Arab-Jordanian relationship, and despite these regional changes, the King had never ceased his relationship with the West - particularly with Britain. In sum, through Western might only, the monarch once again succeeded in saving his throne.

As far as legitimacy issue is concerned, the idea of lack of legitimacy remained the weak point for potential longevity of the Kingdom and continued to shed its lights every so often during his epoch. Although, the king had - despite some difficulty - successfully maintained his throne, but nevertheless, the menace of foreign temptations - including Israel - to breach the sovereignty of his kingdom remained valid even after more than four decades since the establishment of the Hashemite tenet in Jordan. Such weakness had forced the king to repeatedly seek various alliances who considerably enjoy regional power or influence at that particular given period. Ultimately, it had resulted in various implications particularly toward democratic 'process'. It appears however that Jordan's foreign relations - encompassing alliance strategy - whether directly or indirectly was linked to its relationship with Israel or Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel Prime Minister Ben Gurion, for instance, had planned in 1956 to annex the West Bank in addition to part of southern Lebanon to Israel whilst incorporating the East bank to Iraq. A proposal was presented on the eve of Suez crises (Smith, 1996: 172).

On the other extreme end, the head of the then newly founded Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Ahmad Al Shuraiqui, had maintained in Amman in July 1964, that Jordan with its two banks is part of Palestine. Such announcement

had infuriated the king who accordingly suspended all offices and activities associated with the organization. Even the Americans who have not recognized the Kingdom until 1955, nine years since its declaration of independence, avoided mentioning the name of the king in most of their declarations and announcement (ibid. 188). Let alone, the Syrian and Egyptians cases that habitually claimed the illegitimacy of the kingdom as it an extension of greater Syria.

II.II. King Hussein and the advent of the American regional supremacy

Relations between Jordan and the United States date back to 1949 when diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. It developed widely after the end of the British role in Jordan due to the impact of the Arabization of the army in 1956, as the amount of US aid to Jordan increased in the political, economic and military fields (Hotze, 2017). Since then, the United States has been interested in strengthening its relations with Jordan. A significant development in relations was achieved in 1974 because of the visit of former US President Richard Nixon to Jordan. This visit has resulted in establishing joint committees between the two countries. The mission of these committees is to supervise all aspects of cooperation in the areas of trade, development, military, technical and economic assistance to enable Jordan to contribute to the peace and stability of the Middle East.

In 1975, US President Gerald Ford classified Jordan as a beneficiary of the law, giving Jordan the advantage of benefiting from the export of certain duty-free goods to the United States of America. The United States has also supported Jordan through economic and military assistance over the years (Fayez, 2013).

Also, the United States considered its assistance to Jordan a key pillar in its international relations and an important tool for the implementation of its foreign policy, which has developed a number of bodies to promote the policy of assistance, the most important of which was the US Agency for International Development and the US Agency for Information, where the proceeds of US aid to Jordan amounted to about \$ 13.10 billion From 1950 to 2012 (Fayez, 2015).

This assistance helped shape the relations between the two countries in the light of the Jordanian foreign policy message which affirmed the protection of Jordan's national interests and the preservation of its gains, and enhancing the role of Jordan based on openness, moderation and regional and international moderation (Sasley, 2002). In this context, Jordan has developed a number of institutional objectives for Jordan's diplomacy, foremost among which is the improvement, enhancement and development of Jordan's relations with other countries, especially the major powers, which have the potential to serve Jordan's interests and regional issues (Latorre, 2016). During the pre-1990s, Jordanian-American relations had some tension for reasons related to regional factors, such as the Palestinian issue and the situation between Iraq and Kuwait (Fayez, 2015).

These two issues resulted in the need for Jordan to balance Jordan's foreign relations network at the Arab, regional and international levels in order to achieve its political stability. The Jordanian-American relations show the strength of the relations between the two sides. Jordan has achieved a global position in order to employ its relations with the major powers, especially with the United States, to serve the Arab and international issues. In its political movements, Jordan relied on the references and decisions of international legitimacy, such as the road map between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Annapolis Conference in 2007 and the Arab Peace Initiative adopted unanimously by the Arab states at the Beirut conference in 2002 (Fayez, 2015). Arab Peace Initiative represented a historic opportunity to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, So that Palestine would be an independent state in exchange for security guarantees for Israel to live peacefully with its neighbors (Ryan, 2004). The Jordanian-American relations have certainly been affected by Jordan's positions towards the Arab issues and the policies of the major powers and their allies on the Middle East and its future. These policies have played a major role in the nature of Jordan-US relations in terms of their progress or recklessness.

During the 1990s period, the American failed to guarantee Jordan's external threats touching its own existence and survival. For instance, even after the signing of the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel, where the US was the key political sponsor, Jordan nonetheless has not been able to eradicate Israeli's long desires towards Jordan. The Likud party for example, still upholds the notion that the East Bank (Jordan) is an extension of Israel. They are advocating the idea of

making the kingdom as the home country for the Palestinians “Palestine is Jordan” which in turn contradict in nature with the 1993 Oslo Accord between Israel (represented by the Labor party) and the Palestinian Liberalization Organization (PLO) (Dawood, 1999). As for Palestinians, who strive in 1970 to topple the Jordanian monarch, their interests may not recently appear to pose any valid relevance; future however remains open for speculations in this direction. One analyst contends “Jordan will never again rule the West Bank, but the Palestinian may eventually rule Jordan” (Ze’ev, 1989: 66).

II.III. King Abdullah II, the US and the Deal of Century

Jordan’s external challenges remain at stake with advent of the new millennium and with arrival of King Abdullah II to the throne to be proclaimed the fourth king of the Hashemite in Jordan in 1999. “Cold peace” continues to dominate the Jordanian – Israeli overall relations. Jordan remains cautious over Israel political intensions as far as its perspective on resolving its contentious conflict with Palestinians. But one of the most notorious incidences revealing such concerns during King Abdullah II, as far as Jordan’s sovereign threat is concerned, is very much associated with the mounting echoes of what is called “deal of the century” advocated by president Trump’s administration. The chief architects of such scheme are Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, peace envoy Jason Greenblatt, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman whilst Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and president Trump are seen at the heart of the “conspiracy scheme”. The worrying feature of such project lies in the fact that it is predominantly “compulsory” with almost no rooms to renegotiate over key conflicting issues especially as far as Palestinians are concerned. Clare short defended that “The US envoy for the Middle East, Jason Greenblatt, said that the US plan was designed to benefit the region as a whole, and did not require the consent of the Palestinians. He said the US “deal of the century” was a regional plan designed to end the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and create an Arab- Israeli Coalition to counter Iran and terrorism” (Short, 2018).

Although no official declarations or agreements have been issued so far, there is almost a consensus amongst analyst and decision makers alike, that the potential “deal” as such will put an end to Palestinian Israeli conflict at the expense of Palestinians and Jordanians respectively – whereby the moving of the US embassy to Jerusalem was thought to be just the initial part of the plan.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), along with all Palestinian factions, has voiced their rejection to the Deal. They condemned the rearrangement of the US embassy to Jerusalem and President Trump’s announcement that the city would act as the united capital of Israel (Palestine Chronicle, 2017).

As far as Jordan is concerned, the threat is no longer implicit, whether talking openly or whispers, the far end result would with no doubt adversely affect the kingdom’s political stability. Notwithstanding its symbolic significance, potential fears go beyond undermining the Hashemite custodianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. It is nonetheless related to threatening the existing political map of the kingdom. Explicit statements now and then vividly present old taboo scenarios in terms of the status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the possibility of “transfer scenario” whereby evacuating Palestinians inhabiting the West Bank to be “transferred to Jordan, the potential establishment of confederation between Jordan and Palestinian Authority.

The likelihood of worst scenarios to take place evolved along mounting disunity of Arab regimes in past few years. In fact, Jordan began to lose its traditional Arab allies – especially some of Gulf region- who implicitly agrees with general themes of the deal as they consider that Iran not Israel is the key potential enemy in the region and the former can be an important ally to counter Iranians. Abdulwahhab Badrakhman examined the overall potential consequences of “Deal of Century” and defended that, “At the same time, if American and Arab pressures remain the same, and this is likely, this will only mean that those applying pressure are aiming for the same result: targeting Jordan’s stability as part of the ” deal of the century” (Middle East Monitor, 2018).

In same vein, the Jerusalem Post revealed the other expected dark side of the deal, the potential dual political and security implications of confederation / refugees synthesis on Jordan by maintaining that, “A confederation between the two banks of the Jordan River would be dominated by the Palestinians and a threat to the future of the kingdom. About

70% of Jordan's population of nearly 10 million is of Palestinian origin, including an estimated two million with refugee status. Add to that nearly three million in the West Bank and Abdullah's dilemma becomes clearer" (Jerusalem Post, 2018). The well-known British Broadcasting news (BBC) posted reports stating that deal of century encompasses a number of stages by which the third stage entails transformation of Palestinian West Bankers in Jordan alongside granting Palestinian refugees first degree Jordanian citizenship in return of huge financial assistance package to Jordan (BCC, September 2018). Furthermore, Taher Al-Masri, the Jordanian ex-Prime Minister, warns the serious near future political challenges as he vividly advocated that the Deal of Century has been already implemented even though it has not been officially announced (BCC, August 2018).

What is really worrying nowadays resides in the fact that financial power is becoming an effective mounting role by foreign powers – mainly the US and some Arab Gulf states - to influence behavior of Jordanian foreign policy. By either ceasing financial support to implement existing schemes or projects (e.g. UNRWA) or making financial assistance a conditional matter to blackmail Jordanian decision makers on issues relating to unwanted themes associated with what is called "Deal of Century".

The Middle Monitor clearly demonstrated how the US and some Arab Gulf states are exerting so much pressure on Jordan – mainly in terms of ceasing financial aids – to comply Jordan to accept those terms associated with the Deal of Century as it contends that " At the same time, if American and Arab pressures remain the same, and this is likely, this will only mean that those applying pressure are aiming for the same result: targeting Jordan's stability as part of the " deal of the century" (The Middle East Monitor, June 2018). In this respect, some Arab Gulf states are also engaged in such scheme whereby they are attempting to "pressure the kingdom into accepting the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan [Deal of the Century] being developed by the United States" (Al-Monitor, June 2018).

Certainly, regardless the prospected nature of the "Deal of Century", there is almost a consensus amongst various voices – whether by scholars or decision-makers –that such expected scheme should pose a challenge to Jordan's political map and stability alike. To this end, it is becoming so obvious how financial assistance has taken different shapes of influence towards Jordan's political stability. Whereas in the past, financial support by foreign donors of great powers was seen a positive mean to maintain political stability status quo in Jordan, it is nonetheless becoming nowadays a backfire instrument or weapon against state's stability wishes.

Conclusion

Ever since the very early foundation of the "political entity" of Jordan last century, the emirate – the kingdom later on – was and remains under repetitive attempts and conspiracies that challenged its sustainability and survival. Such challenges have taken different shapes and forms throughout the years.

This study presented in different chapters and sections how these threats erupted and under what condition and how the kingdom – visas foreign intervention powers – manages to overcome them. In it, the study attempted to answer three main questions: To what extent traditional security challenges facing Jordan sovereignty and its existence remain today? And how the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan managed to survive these challenges since its creation in 1921?

The paper examined three main eras of Jordanian monarchs: king Abdullah I, King Hussein, and King Abdullah II. Through all these reigns, the Kingdom witnessed different facets of threats that challenge its political stability and survival. Foreign power role was immensely significant in maintaining and preserving its continuity. Although each era has its distinctive characteristics, they all together nonetheless reflect a different shape of threat or challenge faced the kingdom. Previous threats were more of coercive/militant oriented threats while most of the latest ones are more of political explicit ones (e.g. the Deal of the Century).

Jordanian and non-Jordanian narratives have examined the nature of political stability challenges from different perspectives. For instance, in the contemporary history of modern Jordan, legitimacy as such remains of a high security concern for the Jordanian regime. Abdul Ra'oof Al Rawabdi, former Prime Minister of Jordan, asserted that the first challenge facing the kingdom in contemporary days reside within its own historical challenge maintaining that before

1921 Jordan had no identity under the Ottoman mandate like that of Syria for instance (Al Rawabdih, 2018)¹³. For instance, the kingdom continued to undergo through several – whilst not highly threatening – regional threats in the past few decades. For instance, Syria – who still implicitly considers that Jordan along with Lebanon, and Palestine/Israel as part of greater Syria– attempted twice to invade Jordan in 1970 and 1980 respectively. Both threats were stopped only by Israeli’s warnings (Bligh, 2001: 15).

In short, “To talk of the opposition in Jordan is to tread in sensitive territory. The circumstances surrounding the creation of Jordan in the early years 1920s and what could be described as –“security phobia” a sense that the country’s very existence is in constant danger –seem to have convinced most Jordanians that maintaining their unity should always remain their top priority...there is a wide consensus among Jordanian that Jordan’s neighbors pose most serious threat to its security” (Dawood, 1999).

Though, there is an alarming factor in the stability of Jordan formula should be addressed. What is becoming very challenging to Jordan’s survival and stability today resides in the fact that those great powers who advocated the stability of Jordan for long decades since it’s established (e.g. the US in specific) are becoming serious threatening actors in this respect. The latest ‘peace’ scheme proposed by the US under what is called “Deal of Century” is deemed clear-cut illustration of the abrupt adverse role - by one of major traditional allies of Jordan – towards kingdom’s political stability.

Such alarming factor is exacerbated by the fact that financial assistance – which was traditionally essential backbone mean by great powers to foster Jordan’s political stability – is becoming nowadays a backfire weapon against such trend with special reference to latest advent US foreign policy under president Trump’s administration whereby political conditionality is becoming vividly an arm twisting instrument to influence Jordan’s attitude – who is greatly suffers from severe economic and financial hardships - to accept main principles of the Deal of Century”.

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تقييم دور التاريخ السياسي للقوى الخارجية تجاه استراتيجية البقاء للأردن (1921-2018)

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ملخص

يحاول هذا البحث دراسة وتحليل التحديات الإقليمية التقليدية مقارنة بالتحديات الإقليمية التي تواجه الأردن اليوم، وما دور القوى الخارجية وتأثيرها في استراتيجية البقاء للمملكة. ومن هنا يحاول البحث الإجابة عن الأسئلة: أي مدى التحديات الإقليمية التقليدية لا زالت تواجه المملكة اليوم خاصة فيما يتعلق في استراتيجيتها في البقاء؟ وكيف استطاعت المملكة تجاوز هذه التحديات منذ 1921؟ وما دور القوى الخارجية في التأثير على مجريات الأمور بهذا الخصوص؟ تأتي هذه الأسئلة في خضم تنوع التحديات الإقليمية التي كانت ولا زالت تهدد بقاء الدولة الأردنية بين الفينة والأخرى. ومن خلالها، يأتي البحث ليبيّن سياسة المملكة في البقاء في معترك هذه التحديات من جهة ودور القوى الخارجية من جهة أخرى. كان من الضروري تسليط الضوء على البعد التاريخي وأهم المنعطفات السياسية التي تأثر بها الأردن لتسهيل محاولتنا للإجابة عن الأسئلة المدونة أعلاه. وقد توصلت الرسالة إلى نتائج عديدة أهمها، أن التحديات الإقليمية مازالت موجودة لتهدد الاستقرار والبقاء للأردن - قد تكون أحيانا بأشكال مختلفة. وأن من أهم المفارقات بين الماضي والمعاصر فيما يخص هذه التهديدات، أنها انتقلت من التهديدات العسكرية إلى التهديدات السياسية وبالتحديد من قبل إسرائيل، والأهم من ذلك أنّ كليهما بالرغم من الاختلاف في نوعية التهديد، بقيا مهددين لبقاء الدولة بين الفينة والأخرى.

الكلمات الدالة: النجاة، الاستقرار، المساعدة المالية، السيادة، الشرعية، السياسة الخارجية.

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