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(57)

(35)

.(Arens, et. al., 2010)

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(ACFE, 2010)

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106 2009 2008

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" (ACFE)

(ACFE, 2010) "

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. (Mckinsey, 2002; ACFE, 2010)

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(Certified Fraud Examiner CFE)

.(Lartey, 2012)

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- Investor Protection Act).
- (The
- Investor Protection Act).
1. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
2. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
3. Financial Executives International (FEI)
4. Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
5. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)
6. Institute of Management Accountants (IMA)
7. Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)

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(Robu, et. al., 2012)

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(Ernst & Young, 2008) Block
BDO,) Development Office (BDO)
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(KPMG, 2007)

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(Akpomi, and Nnadi, 2005)

Kreutzfeldt,) (Persons, 1995) (280)

(Mada, 2009) (et. al., 1986) (228)

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(ACFE, 2010) Likert Scale

%5 .

%48 %30

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Cornbach

Kirkos, et. al.,) :

(2007 (%96) Alpha

.(Bryman and Cramer, 2005) (%60)

(Persons, 1995) . /

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Farber,) :

(Mada, 2009) (2005 : ()

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. (Persons, 1995) :

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4.490	3.520	0.230	17.500	()
0.229	0.305	0.038	0.906	
0.107	0.057	-0.271	0.355	()

Ernst) (Deloitte & Touche) : BIG 4 (1)
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers) (& Young (3.52)
.(Arans, 2010) (KPMG) (4.49)
Grant) (17.5)
(Thornton (0.23)
. (3.52)
(0.305)
. (Big 5) (Big 4)
(0.038) (0.906)
(%63) (22)
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(0.27-) (0.35)
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(2)

One – Sample

(3-1)

One - (T)

(3-1)

.T- Test

.0.05

Sample Test

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(2)

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(2)

One Sample Test

		Sig. (2-tailed)		
0.93	3.70	0.000	()	1
0.94	3.32	0.000	.	2
1.02	3.08	40.24	.	3
0.98	3.07	0.282	.	4
1.00	3.30	0.000	.	5
1.07	3.24	0.001	.	6
0.99	2.93	0.258	.	7
0.93	2.95	0.395	.	8
0.95	2.93	0.266	.	9
0.83	2.94	0.263	.	10
0.84	2.82	0.002	.	11
0.94	2.95	0.395	.	12
0.94	3.07	0.234	.	13

		Sig. (2-tailed)		
1.03	2.85	0.030		14
0.89	2.89	0.064		15
0.93	2.95	0.395		16
0.98	2.54	0.000	(Hotline)	17
0.72	3.03	0.519		

" (2)

(Whistle Blower Hotline)

Sig. (3)

(0.05)

(Whistle blower

ACFE,)

(KPMG, 2007)

(9 8 7)

(Albercht, 2006)

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Sarbanes Oxley 404

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11 6 5 2 1)

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One – Sample T- Test 12

16 15

(3)

One Sample Test

		Sig. (2-tailed)		
0.93	3.06	0.355		18
900.	2.92	0.158		19
0.90	2.86	0.016		20
0.87	2.81	0.001		21
0.91	2.81	0.002		22
0.88	2.94	0.330		23
0.96	3.06	0.372		24
0.90	2.92	0.185		25
0.98	3.06	0.379	: .3 .2 .1 .4	26
1.03	2.87	0.063		27
0.92	2.75	0.000		28
0.68	2.91	0.054		

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(3)

" (22) .
 " (0.054) Sig.
 " (0.05)
 22 21 20) .
 (28 Sig
 . (0.05)

Ernst & Young)

.(Ireland, 2008

(4) .
 .One – Sample T- Test " (20)
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(4)

One Sample Test

		Sig. (2-tailed)		
0.96	3.13	0.039	.()	29
0.95	213.	0.001		30
1.03	2.96	0.522	.	31
1.05	3.36	0.000	.	32
1.03	113.	0.109	() : () () ()	33
0.92	2.94	0.348		34
0.94	2.86	0.025	.	35

		Sig. (2-tailed)		
0.88	2.92	0.175		36
0.95	2.99	0.889		37
0.91	2.68	0.000	.	38
0.92	2.79	0.001		39
0.98	2.95	0.459	.	40
1.05	2.83	0.014		41
1.06	2.70	0.000	(CFE) /	42
1.03	2.73	0.000		43
0.70	2.94	0.230		

.(KPMG, 2007)

(4)

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" (42) (0.230) Sig. ."
(CFE) " (0.05)
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(37)

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32 30 29)

(43 42 41 39 38 35

" (40) (sig.=0.000)

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(BDO, 2009)

(Akpomi, 2005)

(SPSS Means) (7-4)
Bryman and) Rank) (6-4)
(Cramer, 2005) (Correlations Pearson
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(5) (SPSS Means)
(6)
() (Categorical scale)
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				1		
					Sig.	
			1	0.074		
				0.266	Sig.	
		1	0.582**	0.085		
			0.000	0.201	Sig.	
	1	-0.402**	-0.023	-0.023		
		0.000	0.727	0.727	Sig.	

. %10 %5 ** *

(6)

SPSS means

	SPSS means	
0.064		
0.336	Sig.	

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(0.074)

.(Mckinsey, 2002)

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(Whistleblower

Hotline)

Kreutzfeldt, et. al.,) (Persons, 1995)

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SPSS Means

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Ability of Jordanian Companies to Prevent and Detect Fraud: An Analytical Study of Service Sector

Jamal Abdel-Rahman Abu Serdaneh, Muhannad Ahmad Atmeh** and Mohammad Ibrahim Alhawi***

ABSTRACT

The study aimed at measuring the ability of Jordanian listed service sector companies to prevent and detect fraud and examining the association between the dependent variable (Antifraud Scale) and the independent variables (share price, profitability, financial leverage and the size of external auditor). To achieve the objectives of the study, a questionnaire has been distributed among a sample of (35) companies, which formed 62% of the population. The major findings of this study indicated that Jordanian service sector companies do not apply antifraud system to prevent and detect fraud in its full strategic plan, but they do apply some individual items of the antifraud system. Also, the results showed that there is no significant association between the dependent variable and any of the four independent variables.

KEYWORDS: Antifraud, Fraud, Jordanian Service Sector.

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