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One-sample t-test

Independent-sample t-test

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(2007

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Cadbury Committee

1992

Treadway Commission

1990

Enron

WorldCom

Al-Najjar )

2002

(Sarbanas-Oxley Act)

.2011/10/4

2008/4/11

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2012 ©

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2004  
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(28) 1997 (22)  
2002 (76) 2000  
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(Al-Najjar,2007) ) %77  
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(Cattrysse,2002)

(Velury, et al, 2005)

2004

2004

Porter & )

(mark, 2007

.(Governance)

<sup>1</sup>Corporate Governance

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2004

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- " (1989 )
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- " (2003 )
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- (Institutional Investor Magazine)
- %89
- (Beasley, 1996)
- (22)

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 (Friday and Sirmans, 1998)  
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 (Clasessens, 2003)  
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 (Al-Najjar, 2007)  
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(23 ) :

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90 = ((0.0025

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(1)

.(Sekaran, 2003) %60

(%94)

.(%94)

:(1)

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|      |    |  |
| 0.76 | 14 |  |
| 0.89 | 10 |  |
| 0.89 | 6  |  |
| 0.88 | 11 |  |
| 0.88 | 6  |  |
| 0.87 | 6  |  |
| 0.94 | 53 |  |

( )

(2)

.3.62

3.87

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.0.38

4.89

: :(2)

|    |      |      |     |
|----|------|------|-----|
|    |      |      |     |
| 1  | 0.38 | 4.89 | .1  |
| 2  | 0.33 | 3.96 | .2  |
| 8  | 0.74 | 3.79 | .3  |
| 12 | 1.01 | 3.76 | .4  |
| 9  | 1.05 | 3.78 | .5  |
| 14 | 0.95 | 3.62 | .6  |
| 13 | 0.93 | 3.68 | .7  |
| 3  | 1.05 | 3.92 | .8  |
| 4  | 0.89 | 3.89 | .9  |
| 11 | 1.02 | 3.76 | .10 |
| 7  | 1.09 | 3.79 | .11 |
| 10 | 1.03 | 3.76 | .12 |
| 6  | 1.17 | 3.79 | .13 |



|   |      |      |     |
|---|------|------|-----|
|   |      |      |     |
| 5 | 1.10 | 3.80 | .14 |
|   |      | 3.87 |     |

.4.68 ( ) (3)

: (3)

|    |      |      |     |
|----|------|------|-----|
|    |      |      |     |
| 1  | 0.88 | 4.68 | .1  |
| 2  | 0.70 | 3.88 | .2  |
| 4  | 0.95 | 3.72 | .3  |
| 3  | 1.06 | 3.79 | .4  |
| 7  | 1.22 | 3.54 | .5  |
| 8  | 1.23 | 3.54 | .6  |
| 9  | 1.28 | 3.54 | .7  |
| 5  | 1.09 | 3.61 | .8  |
| 10 | 1.29 | 3.39 | .9  |
| 6  | 1.37 | 3.59 | .10 |
|    | 3.72 |      |     |

3.39

( ) ( )  
(4) (3.72)

( ) )  
.3.25 (2004  
3.44 (4)

: (4)

|      |      |      |    |
|------|------|------|----|
|      |      |      |    |
| 1    | 1.25 | 4.00 | .1 |
| 2    | 1.04 | 3.45 | .2 |
| 3    | 1.07 | 3.39 | .3 |
| 6    | 1.23 | 3.25 | .4 |
| 4    | 1.28 | 3.32 | .5 |
| 5    | 1.42 | 3.26 | .6 |
| 3.44 |      |      |    |

( ) (5)  
(4.33)

: (5)

|    |      |      |     |
|----|------|------|-----|
|    |      |      |     |
| 1  | 1.07 | 4.33 | .1  |
| 6  | 0.85 | 3.60 | .2  |
| 11 | 0.94 | 3.18 | .3  |
| 8  | 1.10 | 3.46 | .4  |
| 9  | 1.24 | 3.42 | .5  |
| 10 | 1.27 | 3.41 | .6  |
| 7  | 1.10 | 3.53 | .7  |
| 2  | 1.06 | 3.72 | .8  |
| 3  | 1.18 | 3.71 | .9  |
| 4  | 1.12 | 3.69 | .10 |
| 5  | 1.18 | 3.69 | .11 |
|    |      | 3.61 |     |

( )  
(3.61) (3.18)  
(4.02) ( )  
"  
"  
(3.47) (3.27)  
(Fridy and Sirmans,1998)  
(6)

: (6)

|   |      |      |    |
|---|------|------|----|
|   |      |      |    |
| 1 | 1.10 | 4.02 | .1 |
| 2 | 0.93 | 3.58 | .2 |
| 3 | 0.99 | 3.36 | .3 |
| 5 | 1.18 | 3.28 | .4 |
| 4 | 1.31 | 3.34 | .5 |
| 6 | 1.39 | 3.27 | .6 |
|   | 3.47 |      |    |

( ) (7)

.3.24

(3.57)

( )

4.24

: (7)

|   |      |      |    |
|---|------|------|----|
|   |      |      |    |
| 1 | 1.09 | 4.24 | .1 |
| 2 | 0.99 | 3.56 | .2 |
| 6 | 1.05 | 3.24 | .3 |
| 4 | 1.04 | 3.47 | .4 |
| 5 | 1.14 | 3.44 | .5 |

|   |      |      |    |
|---|------|------|----|
|   |      |      |    |
|   |      |      |    |
| 3 | 1.40 | 3.48 | .6 |
|   |      | 3.57 |    |

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(3.87).

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(One sample t-test) (t)

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<sup>1</sup>.

1. : (

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2. :

(8) (t)

(17.438) (0.001  $\geq 0.05$ ) (9) (t) (8.498) (0.004  $\geq 0.05$ ) (1.988) (t)

:(8) (t) (1.988).

|        |    |       |        |  |
|--------|----|-------|--------|--|
| *      |    | t     | t      |  |
| *0.001 | 84 | 1.988 | 17.438 |  |

\*(0.05  $\geq \alpha$ )

(3.72).

$$3 = 5 / (5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1) =$$

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  \*  
:

.4

:(9)

(t) (11)

| *     |    | t     | t     |  |
|-------|----|-------|-------|--|
| 0.004 | 84 | 1.988 | 8.498 |  |

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  0.003 (4.774)  
.(1.988) (t)

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  \*

.(3.47) : .3

(t) (10)

(4.161)  
(t)  $(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  0.002  
.(1.988)  
.(3.44)

:(11)

| *     |    | t     | t     |  |
|-------|----|-------|-------|--|
| 0.003 | 84 | 1.988 | 4.774 |  |

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$  \*

:(10)

| *     |    | t     | t     |  |
|-------|----|-------|-------|--|
| 0.002 | 84 | 1.988 | 4.161 |  |

: .5

:(13)

(t)

(12)

| *     |    | t     | t     |  |
|-------|----|-------|-------|--|
| 0.004 | 84 | 1.988 | 6.004 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

(7.550)

(0.05 ≥ α) 0.001

.(1.988)

(t)

.(3.61)

.(3.57)

:(12)

| *     |    | t     | t     |  |
|-------|----|-------|-------|--|
| 0.001 | 84 | 1.988 | 7.550 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

(Independent sample

t-test)

:

.6

:

.7

(t)

(13)

(14)

(0.05 ≥ α) %0.000

≥ α) 0.004

(6.004)

.(1.988)

(t)

(0.05

.(3.17)

(3.80) (3.99)

:(14)

|        | t     | t    |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|------|----|------|------|----|--|
| *0.000 | 1.960 | 4.56 | 82 | 0.95 | 3.17 | 20 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.45 | 3.99 | 22 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.51 | 3.80 | 43 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

(0.05 ≥ α) %5

(3.78) (3.88)

(2.62)

:

.8

(15)

:(15)

|        | t     | t     |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|-------|----|------|------|----|--|
| *0.000 | 1.960 | 6.100 | 82 | 0.93 | 2.62 | 20 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.68 | 3.88 | 22 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.59 | 3.78 | 43 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

:

.9

(16)

(0.05 ≥ α) %5



(3.59)

(3.49)

.(2.29)

:(16)

|        | t     | t    |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|------|----|------|------|----|--|
| *0.000 | 1.960 | 5.60 | 82 | 0.88 | 2.29 | 20 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.87 | 3.59 | 22 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.75 | 3.49 | 43 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

(3.69) (3.82)

:

.10

.(2.64)

(17)

(0.05 ≥ α) %5

:(17)

|        | t     | t    |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|------|----|------|------|----|--|
| *0.000 | 1.960 | 6.40 | 82 | 0.76 | 2.64 | 20 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.68 | 3.82 | 22 |  |
|        |       |      |    | 0.60 | 3.69 | 43 |  |

.(0.05 ≥ α)

\*

: .11

.(2.14)

(18)

(0.05 ≥ α) %5

(3.85)

(2.98)

:(18)

|        | t     | t     |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|-------|----|------|------|----|--|
| 0.000* | 1.960 | 7.332 | 82 | 0.57 | 2.14 | 20 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.84 | 3.85 | 22 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.45 | 2.98 | 43 |  |

(0.05 ≥ α) \*

(19)

(0.05 ≥ α) %5

: .12

:(19)

|        | t     | t     |    |      |      |    |  |
|--------|-------|-------|----|------|------|----|--|
| *0.012 | 1.960 | 6.687 | 82 | 0.55 | 2.45 | 20 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.82 | 3.95 | 22 |  |
|        |       |       |    | 0.65 | 3.12 | 43 |  |

$(0.05 \geq \alpha)$

\*

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.1

(3.95)

(3.12)

.2

.(2.45)

.3

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2006

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|           |      |      |
|-----------|------|------|
|           | 1    | 2004 |
| 1971 (23) |      |      |
| 1997 (22) |      | 2004 |
| 2000 (28) |      |      |
| 2002 (76) |      |      |
|           | 2003 |      |
|           |      | 2004 |
| (39)      |      |      |
|           | 2004 |      |
|           |      | 1989 |
|           |      | 2000 |

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## The Effect of Corporate Governance Principles Adoption in The Institutional Investor's Decisions in Amman Bourse

*M. Ishhadat and Tawfiq Abed Al-Jaleel*

### ABSTRACT

This study examined the effect of corporate governance principles adoption on the institutional investor's decisions in Amman Bourse. It focused on the importance given by Jordanian institutional investors to the adoption of corporate governance principles in shareholding companies. The study also tried to identify the differences in the estimation of the importance of governance mechanisms in Jordanian shareholding companies among the two institutional investors groups (the first group consisted of portfolio managers in insurance companies and the second group consisted of portfolio managers in banks and brokerage houses). The study measured the data reliability using cronbach's alpha, described statistically the study variables, used one sample t-test to determine the importance of the study variables on institutional investors' investments, and the Independent sample t-test to measure the significant differences between the two study groups. The study concluded that the institutional investors in Jordan give importance to the adoption of all the corporate governance principles on their investment decisions, also they give importance to the following variables: (disclosure level in shareholding companies, mechanisms that ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders, the board role in monitoring the management performance, the companies' management procedures to emphasize the protection of shareholders rights). The results showed that there are significant differences in the importance evaluation of the corporate governance mechanisms in Jordanian companies between the two study groups. Finally the researchers recommended further studies as index preparation for corporate governance in Jordan, and a comparative study for the adoption of corporate governance in Jordan and other countries).

**KEYWORDS:** Corporate Governance, Investment, Institutional Investor.

M. Ishhadat, Jordan Central Bank.

Tawfiq Abed Al-Jaleel, Faculty of Business, UJ.

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