

(2006-2000)

"

"

2006 -2000

Least-Squares Dummy Variable

Regression Model

. 0.000

.0.000

(Cassar and Holmes,

(Green Murinde and Suppakitjarak, 2002)
(Esperance et al., 2003)
(Hall et al., 2004)

(Myers, 2001)

2003)

(TOT) Trade-Off

Theory

(POT) Pecking-Order

Theory

(Modigliani and Miller, 1958)

Asymmetric Information

(MTT) Market Timing Theory

.2010/11/11

2009/5/17

Berk (2005)

(Brealy and Myers, 2000)

:
(POT) Pecking-Order Theory .1

Asymmetric Information

Least-Squares Dummy Variable

SPSS

Regression

2006 2000

Myers and

POT

Myers (1984)

Majluf (1984)

()

()

MTT

POT

(2006)

-

(2003-1995)

(TOT) Trade-Off Theory .2
 Tax Shield
 Bankruptcy Costs
 Agency Costs

:(2005)

-

POT

(2001)

-

(1998-1978)

(MTT) Market Timing Theory .3

Wald

Fama and French (2002)

-

(1999)

			Shyam-Sunder and Myers	
Ang, Chua and	Warner (1977)	-	Lemmon and Zender (2004)	(1999)
	McConnel (1982)		Chirinko and Singha (2000)	
	Bankruptcy Costs			
Titman and Wessels		(1988)		
			Green, Murinde and	-
	TOT		Myers (2001)	Suppakitjarak (2002)
				Miller (1977)
POT				
		TOT		
				Greham (2000)
	Rajan and Zingales (1995)	-		%10
				Lasfer (1995)
Berk			Titman and Wessels (1988)	-
		(2005)	Fama and	Rajan and Zingales (1995)
				French (2002)
				(Tangibility)
	2003 - 2002	2001 - 2000		
	0.05			
			TOT	

	Mramor (2006)		
.ROA		Growth Prospects of	.6
		the Firm	
	Tax Shelter-Bankruptcy Cost Theory	:	
	Castanias (1983)		
		Rajan and Zingales (1995)	
Titman and	Bradley et al. (1984)	Hall et al. Cassar and Holmes (2003)	
	Wessels (1988)	Barton et al.(1989) (2004)	
	Esperance et al. (2003)	Al-Sakran	
	Jordan et al. (1998)	Roden and Lewellen (1995) (2001)	
		Rajan and Zingales (1995)	
	Taxes		.8
	.Abor (2008)		
			TOT
	Mackie-Mason (1990)		
	Graham (1999)	POT	
Non-Debt		Firm Risk or Volatility	.7
	.9		
	Tax Shield		
Titman and Wessels (1988)			

NDTS

DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)

Non-Debt Tax Shield

Non-Debt Tax Shield

$$LEV_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LNFS_{it} + \beta_2 LNFA_{it} + \beta_3 ROA_{it} + \beta_4 FL_{it} + \beta_5 TANG_{it} + \beta_6 gMB_{it} + \beta_7 sdROA_{it} + \beta_8 TR_{it} + \beta_9 NDTS_{it} + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

.100 ... 5 4 3 2 1 = i
 .Cross-Section i
 t .6 5 4 3 2 1 = t
 .2006-2000 Time- Series
 : $\beta_9, \dots, \beta_3, \beta_2, \beta_1$

2006-2000

: LEV_{it}
 : β_0

Least-Squares
 Dummy Variable Regression Model
 Cross-SPSS
 .Dummy Variable Time-Series Section
 Cross-Section

: $LNFS_{it}$
 : $LNFA_{it}$
 : ROA_{it}
 : FL_{it}
 : $TANG_{it}$
 : gMB_{it}

Collinearity

Cross-Section

		$0 = D_{3i}$		$: sdROA_i$
				$: TR_{it}$
Dummy		(Dummy)		$: NDTS_{it}$
	α_1	.Variable Trap		
	α_3, α_2			
			Fixed Effect Approach	
Least-Squares	(3)			(1)
		Dummy Variable		
Fixed Effect		Dummy Variable		
		"Regression" Model		
			$LEV_{it} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_1 LNFS_{it} + \beta_2 LNFA_{it} + \beta_3 ROA_{it} +$ $\beta_4 FL_{it} + \beta_5 TANG_{it} + \beta_6 gMB_{it} + \beta_7 sdROA_{it} +$ $\beta_8 TR_{it} + \beta_9 NDTS_{it} + e_{it} \dots$	(2)
			β_{0i}	(1)
			β_0	(2)
	0.05			
			Fixed Effect	(2)
$0 = \beta_n : H_0$				"Regression" Model
	n	β_n		
			Least-Squares Dummy	
			.Variable Regression	
			Dummy Variable	(2)
	100	11		
			$LEV_{it} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 D_{2i} + \alpha_3 D_{3i} + \beta_1 LNFS_{it} + \beta_2 LNFA_{it} +$ $\beta_3 ROA_{it} + \beta_4 FL_{it} + \beta_5 TANG_{it} + \beta_6 gMB_{it} +$ $\beta_7 sdROA_{it} + \beta_8 TR_{it} + \beta_9 NDTS_{it} + e_{it} \dots$	(3)
100		89		
258	ASE			
		ASE		
	ASE	%89	i	$1 = D_{2i}$
		%34.4	i	$0 = D_{2i}$
		ASE	i	$1 = D_{3i}$

2000

510 623
 LNFS LNFA 0.475 %29.3 89
 Multi-Collinearity) ASE
 VIF .(2000
 2.062 LNFS LNFA VIF (2) Multi-Collinearity
 1.362
 .Multi-Collinearity (1)

الجدول (1): مصفوفة ارتباط بيرسون.

		LNFS	LNFA	ROA	FL	TANG	gMB	sdROA	TR	NDTS
LNFS	Pearson Correlation	1								
	N	510								
LNFA	Pearson Correlation	.475**	1							
	N	510	510							
ROA	Pearson Correlation	-0.036	0.003	1						
	N	510	510	510						
FL	Pearson Correlation	0.049	0.042	.052**	1					
	N	510	510	510	510					
TANG	Pearson Correlation	-.394**	-.220**	-0.029	-0.31	1				
	N	510	510	510	510	510				
gMB	Pearson Correlation	.216**	.125**	.201**	.136**	-.159**	1			
	N	510	510	510	510	510	510			
sdROA	Pearson Correlation	-.242**	-0.04	-.091*	0.071	0.03	0.052	1		
	N	510	510	510	510	510	510	510		
TR	Pearson Correlation	.104*	.134**	-0.004	0.03	-.167**	.188**	-.123**	1	
	N	510	510	510	510	510	510	510	510	
NDTS	Pearson Correlation	-0.06	-0.03	-0.005	-.182**	.295**	-0.032	-0.02	-.095*	1
	N	510	510	510	510	510	510	510	510	510

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Least-Squares (2)
 Dummy Variable Regression (D) (Auto-Correlation)
 Durbin-Watson
 (LNFS) (3)) 1.194 (D)
 (LEV)
 Durbin-Watson Multi-Collinearity
 .(Economic Significance)

TOT -2 - (-27.982)
Hovakimian -4 - (%39.75)
Al- Sakran (2001) et al. (2004) (20.16) (15.58)
%33 - 4 -
%39.75 %83

:(2)								
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics		
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF	
1 (Constant)	-27.982	13.6		-2.058	0.040			
D2	-0.159	0.279		-3.107	0.031			
D3	3.230	0.209		4.871	0.004			
LNFS	7.238	0.597	0.444	12.115	0.000	0.485	2.062	
LNFA	0.432	1.059	0.012	0.408	0.683	0.734	1.362	
ROA	-0.612	0.089	-0.186	-6.879	0.000	0.891	1.123	
FL	-8.624	0.155	-0.468	-11.194	0.000	0.563	1.007	
TANG	-9.029	0.289	-0.675	-12.498	0.000	0.558	1.061	
gMB	0.372	0.738	0.014	0.504	0.615	0.844	1.184	
sdROA	-0.657	0.208	-0.088	-3.154	0.002	0.847	1.191	
TR	-5.207	11.766	-0.012	-0.443	0.658	0.864	1.157	
NDTS	-4.372	24.237	-0.005	-0.180	0.857	0.782	1.278	
a. Dependent Variable: LEV								
b. Dummy Variable: D2, D3								

(3.83) (1.79) (LEV) (LNFA)
(LNFA)
%0.88
%39.75 %2.2

		(3)
		Model
		1
R		0.822a
R Square		0.675
Adjusted R Square		0.668
Std. Error of the Estimate		17.729674
Change Statistics	R Square Change	0.675
	F Change	94
	df1	11
	df2	498
	Sig. F Change	0.00
Durbin-Watson		1.194

a. Predictors: (Constant), NDTS, ROA, LNFA, sdROA, TR, FL, gMB, LNFS, TANG.

b. Dependent Variable: LEV.

(ROA)
(-1.96)

POT

(16.36)

%11.21

(LEV)

(ROA)


%39.75

%28

. POT

(4)							
Variable	Relationship w. / LEV					Percentiles	
		N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	10%	90%
LEV		510	39.75	0.02	131.35	3.98	89.80
LNFS	+	510	17.60	12.87	23.64	15.58	20.16
LNFA	+	510	2.66	0.00	4.33	1.79	3.83
ROA	-	510	4.93	-55.46	44.09	-1.96	16.36
FL	-	510	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.78
TANG	-	510	0.46	0.01	1.00	0.04	0.90
gMB	+	510	1.67	0.11	11.49	0.65	3.03
sdROA	-	510	2.31	0.00	49.05	0.05	6.24
TR	-	510	0.07	-0.44	0.66	0.02	0.14
NDTS	-	510	0.02	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.06

.(Financial Distress)



$$8.624(FL_{SE}) - 9.029(TANG_{SE}) + 0.372(gMB_{SE}) - 0.657(sdROA_{SE}) - 5.207(TR_{SE}) - 4.372(NDTS_{SE}) + 17.729674 \dots \quad (5)$$

$$LEV_{IN} = -24.752 + 7.238(LNFS_{IN}) + 0.432(LNFA_{IN}) - 0.612(ROA_{IN}) - 8.624(FL_{IN}) - 9.029(TANG_{IN}) + 0.372(gMB_{IN}) - 0.657(sdROA_{IN}) - 5.207(TR_{IN}) - 4.372(NDTS_{IN}) + 17.729674 \dots \quad (6)$$

: LEV_{FI} %1.5

: LEV_{SE} (NDTS)

(LEV) (NDTS)

: LEV_{IN}

%0.26

%0.66

%.39.75

(3) (R²)

%67.5

%67.5

%67.5

(3)

67.5 R²

%41

: (3 2)

% 40.0

%

$$LEV_{FI} = -27.982 + 7.238(LNFS_{FI}) + 0.432(LNFA_{FI}) - 0.612(ROA_{FI}) - 8.624(FL_{FI}) - 9.029(TANG_{FI}) + 0.372(gMB_{FI}) - 0.657(sdROA_{FI}) - 5.207(TR_{FI}) - 4.372(NDTS_{FI}) + 17.729674 \dots \quad (4)$$

$$LEV_{SE} = -28.141 + 7.238(LNFS_{SE}) + 0.432(LNFA_{SE}) - 0.612(ROA_{SE}) -$$

Fixed Effect
Least-Squares Dummy Variable "Regression" Model
Squares Dummy Variable Regression

(Green, Murinde and Suppakitijarak, 2002) (Myers, 2001)

(Esperance et al., 2003)

(Hall et al., 2004) (Cassar and Holmes, 2003)

Sig. F

-3 - 0.05 >

%68

-(3) R²

- 2001
289-273 8
2006
2005
- 1997 22
2002 (4)
.2002 (40)
- Abor, J. 2008. Determinants of the Capital Structure of Ghanaian Firms. [http://www. aercafrica. org/ documents/RR17.pdf](http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/RR17.pdf).
- Al-Sakran, S.A. 2001. Leverage Determinants in the Absence of Corporate Tax System: The Case of Non-Financial Publicly Traded Corporations in Saudi Arabia. **Managerial Finance**, 27(10/11): 58–86.
- Ang, James S., Jess H. Chua and John J. McConnell. 1982. The Administrative Cost of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note. **Journal of Finance**, 37, pp. 219-226.
- Barton, S.L., C.H. Ned and S. Sundaram. 1989. An Empirical Test of Stakeholder Theory Predictions of Capital. **Financial Management**, 18(1): 36–44.
- Berk, A. 2005 .Drivers of Leverage in Slovenian Blue-Chip Firms and Stock Performance Following Substantial Debt Increases. Working Paper No. 172, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?id=1013085>.
- Bradley, M., G.A. Jarrel and E. Han Kim. 1984. On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence. **The Journal of Finance**, 39: 857–880.
- Brealey, Richard and Stuart Myers. 2000. Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill, 6th Ed.
- Cassar, G. and S. Holmes. 2003. Capital Structure and Financing of SMEs: Australian Evidence. **Journal of Accounting and Finance**, 43: 123–147.
- Castanias, R. 1983. Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure. **The Journal of Finance**, 38: 1617–1635.
- Chirinko, R. and A. Singha. 2000. Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure: A Critical Comment. **Journal of Financial Economics** , 58, 417- 425.
- Cole, Rebel A. 2008. What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Privately Held Firms? Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm)
- DeAngelo, H. and R.W. Masulis. 1980. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation. **Journal of Financial Economics**, 8: 3–29.
- Esperança, J.P., P.M.G. Ana and A.G. Mohamed. 2003. Corporate Debt Policy of Small Firms: An Empirical (Re)examination. **Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development**, 10(1): 62–80.
- Fama, E.F. and K.R. French. 2002. Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt. **The Review of Financial Studies**, 15, 1-33.
- Green, C.J., P. Kimuyu, R. Manos and V. Murinde. 2002. How Do Small Firms in Developing Countries Raise Capital? Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey of Kenyan Micro and Small Scale Enterprises. Economic Research Paper No. 02/6. Centre for International, Financial and Economics Research, Department of Economics, Loughborough University. [https://dspace. lboro.ac.uk/dspace- jspui/bitstream/2134/363/erpo2-6.pdf](https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/363/erpo2-6.pdf).

-
- Greham, J.R. 1999. Do Personal Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions? **Journal of Public Economics**, 73: 41–73.
- Greham, J.R. 2000. How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt? **Journal of Finance**, 55, 1901- 1941.
- Hall, G., Hutchinson, P. and Michaelas, N. 2004. Determinants of the Capital Structures of European SMEs. **Journal of Business Finance and Accounting**, 31, 711-728.
- Hovakimian, A., Hovakimian, G. and Tehranian, H. 2004. Determinants of Target Capital Structure: The Case of Dual Debt and Equity Issues. **Journal of Financial Economics**, 71, 517-540.
- Jordan, J., J. Lowe and P. Taylor. 1998. Strategy and Financial Policy in U.K. Small Firms. **Journal of Business Finance and Accounting**, 25(1): 1–27.
- Lemmon, M.L. and J. Zender. 2002. Debt Capacity and Test of Capital Structure. **The Journal of Finance**, 45: 1471–1493.
- Miller, M.H. 1977. Debt and Taxes. **Journal of Finance**, 32: 261–276.
- Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. **American Economic Review** ,48, 655-669.
- Mramor, Duan and Matja Črnigoj. 2006. Alternative Capital Structure Explanations. <http://www.departments.buchnell.edu/management/apfa/Zakopane%zopapers/Crnipoj.pdf>.
- Myers, S.C. 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. **Journal of Finance**, 39, 575-592.
- Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. **Journal of Financial Economics**,13, 187-221.
- Myers, S.C. 2001. Capital Structure. **Journal of Economic Perspectives**, 15(2): 81–102.
- Omet, G. 2006. Ownership Structure and Capital Structure : Evidence from the Jordanian Capital Market (1995-2003). **Corporate Ownership & Control**, 3(4).
- Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales. 1995. What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data. **Journal of Finance**, 50, 1421-1460.
- Roden, D.M. and W.G. Lewellen. 1995. Corporate Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Leverage Buyouts. **Financial Management**, 24: 76–87.
- Shyam-Sunder, L. and S.C. Myers. 1999. Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure. **Journal of Financial Economics**, 51, 219-244.
- Titman, S. and R. Wessels. 1988. The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. **Journal of Finance**, 43, 1-19.
- Wald, J.K. 1999. How Firm Characteristics Affect Capital Structure: An International Comparison. **Journal of Financial Research**, 22: 161–187.
- Warner, J.B. 1977. Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. **The Journal of Finance**, 32(2): 337–347.

Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from Jordan (2000 -2006)*Imad Z. Ramadan and Saleh K. Alokdeh***ABSTRACT**

The aim of this study is to explore the determinants of the corporate capital structure in Jordan, focusing on the period 2000-2006. We explore whether the decision of the firms concerning the financial leverage is in conformity with the patterns proclaimed in previous studies. We analyze the panel data of the Jordanian firms listed in ASE 100 Index to demonstrate the relationship of leverage with: size, age, profitability, liquidity, tangibility, growth prospects, volatility, taxes and non-debt tax shield. This study adopts a Least-Squares Dummy Variable Regression Model with nine independent variables as possible determinants of capital structure of the Jordanian listed companies.

The study concluded a negative correlation with economic and statistical significance between the capital structure of Jordanian companies and all of the company's profitability, liquidity, composition of assets and risks in a significance level less than 0.000. The study also found that the relationship between the capital structure of Jordanian companies and the firm's size is a direct correlation with economic and statistical significance at a level of significance less than 0.000.

The study did not provide any evidence of a relationship between capital structure and all of the company's life, the expected growth of the company and the company's tax shield.

The findings come in line with the results of studies conducted in many developed countries about the capital structure. The results of this study opposed the results of a study conducted by (Myers, 2001) and a study conducted by (Green, Murinde and Suppakitijarak, 2002) regarding the impact of tax-shield on the capital structure. The results of this study differed from the results of a study conducted by (Esperance et al., 2003) about the impact of the company's life on the capital structure. The results also opposed the results of a study conducted by (Hall et al., 2004) and a study conducted by (Cassar and Holmes, 2003) about the impact of the expected growth rate on the company's capital structure.

KEYWORDS: Determinants of capital structure, Jordan.

11931 - 166 .

/

Prof_Imad67@yahoo.com

Assistant Professor, Dept. of Financial and Banking Sciences, Applied Sciences Private University, Amman, Jordan.

.11931 - 166 .

/

Associate Professor, Dept. of Accounting, Applied Sciences Private University, Amman, Jordan.