Israeli-Syrian Negotiation 1991-1996: Missed Opportunities and Elusive Peace

Abstract

This Study aims to analyses the Israeli-Syrian peace talks of 1991-1996 and why they failed to seize many enticing opportunities that were created in the course of their negotiation. This paper argues that the Israelis and Syrians had missed a number of enticing opportunities to solve their conflict during the peace talks of 1991-1996. Because of their rigged positions towards each other, deep distrust and lack of serious willingness to make necessary concessions and compromise. The Major bulk of this study is a discussion to these talks including parties’ motive and Madrid peace conference and their negotiation between 1991 and 1996. To achieve this end, the study has employed a case study approach that would analyze primary and secondary literature on this subject matter so to comprehend different variables and dynamics that influenced these talks and led to its failure. This paper concludes that during these talks many enticing opportunities to solve he parties’ conflict had emerged. However, Tel Aviv and Damascus had missed those many enticing opportunities and failed to hammer out a historical agreement that could have ended their long standing conflict. Keywords: Conflict, Negotiation, Peace, Golan Highest, Enticing Opportunity, Withdrawal, Normalization.